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Abstract
The nondistributivity of compound quantummechanical propositions leads
to a theorem that rules out the possibility of microscopic deterministic hid-
den variables, the Logical No-Go Theorem. We observe that there appear
in fact two distinct nondistributivity relations in the derivation: one with a
semantics governed by an empirical conjunctive syntax, the other composed
of conjunctive primitives in the quantum mechanical probability calculus. We
venture to speculate how the two come to be confused in the derivation of the
theorem.
1 introduction
The 20th century witnessed a revolution in experimental instrumentation from the
likes of the Plank’s black box apparatus to the Stern-Gerlach spin analyzer. From
these there came a wealth of new and unusual data, much of which suggested a
microscopic substructure [1] whose workings were not governed by the then pre-
vailing Newtonian mechanics. Eventually, particles came to be seen no longer as
entities with categorical properties but as carriers of properties that could only be
inferred from the experimental probabilities that they collectively generate. In what
has become the orthodox interpretation of the data and governing theory, quantum
mechanics (QM), the reasoning is taken so far as to call into question the very no-
tion causality implicit to scientific reasoning and as such continues to present to the
interested student an array of counterintuitive conceptual challenges.
To elaborate the new conception there has over the years come several formal-
izations of the quantum theory 1 whose profusion and variety however it now seems
may well have had much of an opposite effect. But a great many of these may be
understood as partial interpretations of the original consistent mathematical formu-
lation credited to Von Neumann [3] and Dirac, and whose modern version is now
standard to most QM texts; to understand this formulation then is to understand
the foundation upon which many of the others are built.
A distinctive feature of the von Neumann formal machinery is its axiomatization
of indeterminacy as fundamental to microscopic events. This is posited via the
Collapse Postulate [4], which helps account for the ubiquitous dispersion of ensemble
experimental values on one hand [5] and for the observation of definite individual
experimental outcomes on the other. Another distinctive feature is its representation
1Schrodinger’s wave mechanics, Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics, Dirac and von Neumann’s
Hilbert space formulation, Feynman’s path integral formulation, von Neumann and Segal’s c-
algebra formalism, Everett’s many worlds interpretation, Gell-Mann and Griffith’s consistent his-
tories formulation, quantum logic formulation advanced by von Neumann and Mackey, and others
[2]
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of the experimental process by the action of Hilbert space operators that among
themselves generally do not commute; this to account for the observation that pairs
of consecutive measurements performed on a single system when temporally reversed
generally do not yield the same pair of outcomes, i.e., for the observation that such
measurements also do not commute. Around these core ideas has developed an
increasingly abstract semantics - rules that lay down the correspondence between
the theoretical terms in the mathematical machinery of quantum mechanics and
observation - now a source of conceptual difficulty for and disagreement among all
interested parties from physicist to philosopher. E.g., what to a Bayesian inclined
mathematician or philosopher are relations concerning the uncertainty of individual
experimental outcomes [6], to an empirically minded experimentalist may be nothing
more than unusual scatter relations [7]. And so forth.
This particular example highlights the central question of concern to an interpre-
tation of the theory: Whether it is possible to supplement the quantum mechanical
description of reality with additional parameters, so called hidden variables (hv),
which would then together give a more ’complete’ account of microscopic processes
and states, including absent in the existing theory, such as those states that cor-
respond to noncommuting experimental outcomes. On this issue there is certainly
a wide range of possible views, but the leading majority opinions, as a matter of
fact and history, are and have been polarized. In the affirmative view, whose early
proponents include A. Einstein, the proposed notion of the quantum particle is at
odds with the very concept of ’particle’ conceived classically as a point in phase
space, and the incompleteness of the theory is self-evident. Those in opposition,
proponents of the conventional or orthodox interpretation, have gone so far as to
produce explicit proofs against the very possibility, somehow managing to prove a
negative.
Among these proof, popularly known as’no-go’ theorems, perhaps the best known
is the one due exclusively to John Bell. By exploiting the locality requirements of
special relativity Bell derives an explicit disagreement between the tenants of the
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local realism and the predictions of QM, summarized in his elegant inequality [8].
Next in order of the interest it has generated over the years is the theorem of
Kochen and Specker (KS) who begin by taking the possibility of isomorphisms from
the Hilbert subspaces of QM to classical Boolean subspaces as a basic constraint on
realist interpretations, then demonstrates that there are none. The significance of
each of these is addressed by the writer in earlier works [9, 10]. Finally there is the
lesser known argument against hidden variables advanced in the mid-sixties by Jauch
and Piron, the Logical no-go theorem [14]. Interest in this proof however peaked
and quickly declined until it is today not much discussed at all 2, the remaining
interest lying mainly in its close association with an earlier and similar argument by
von Neumann and with the later work of Kochen and Specker. More importantly
still is its place in the historical development of logical formulations of the theory,
of quantum logics.
To briefly outline the basic quantum logic idea, to every experimental outcome
there corresponds a proposition (for outcome ’a’, the proposition: ’the experimental
outcome is a’). Then the indeterminacy of measurement outcomes as axiomatized
by von Neumann imposes in an obvious way a certain non-bivalence upon the truth
values of the individual propositions corresponding to those outcomes (such that all
experimental propositions in respect of the physical system upon which measure-
ments are to be taken, experiments performed, are not of necessity either true or
false [15]), i.e. upon the truth values of individual propositions, their system then
corresponding to the set of all measurements that may be made upon the given
physical system. Thus, structural features inherent to the standard formulation’s
Hilbert space, whose operators are bijective [11] in respect of possible observations,
correspond directly to those of the proposition system. By means of semantical
rules, these in turn correspond, presumably, to logical structures extant in the mi-
croscopic physical world and so now framed in the language of quantum mechanics.
2Thompson’s ISI Web of Knowledge lists 1934 citations of Bell’s theorem, 381 of the theorem
of KS, and 92 of the logical no-go theorem, only 10 of those since 2000.
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But such a system and a logic, like their Hilbert space description, are non-Boolean,
hence non-classical.
Those familiar with quantum theory will probably have first encountered this
distinction in some form or other of Bohr’s complementarity [12], as complementary
variables are also variables that do not commute; hence, the logic of their observation
or measurement is necessarily non-Boolean. Given the recent important experimen-
tal welcher-weg tests conducted by S. Afshar and students [13] and the questions
concerning complementarity raised by their results, still under review 3, a critical
review of the complementary semantics, such as the present one, that also maintains
an elementary presentation, could hardly seem to us more timely.
In this article we analyze the particular Logical argument against the existence
of hv’s put forward by Jauch and Piron [14], whose driving force we trace to a
semantical rule for the conjunction of propositions, a
⋂
b, associated with pairs of
measurements that do not commute, [a, b] 6= 0. While the set theoretic and ordinary
logical semantics of the conjunction are well known, the compound being true when
each proposition is separately true, in the new logic there remain questions. The
syntactic structure has been analyzed over the years by many workers in the field,
and in the view of some [16, 14, 17, 18, 3, 19], prima facie in line with its Hilbert space
correspondence, as an experimental proposition the noncommutative conjunction is
tautologically false. However according to others [20, 21, 22, 23, 24], and in line with
more direct semantics, such compounds are not experimental propositions that bear
on individual systems at all, but are in this respect formal expressions having no
real meaning. It is entirely possible that this issue cannot be settled objectively, as
the difference in opinion may be grounded in the much longer standing difference in
interpretation of the quantum theory itself. In this article we attempt to understand
the noncommutative conjunction exclusively in terms of its use.
In section 1 we consider a microscopic experiment instrumental in motivating the
conceptual development of quantum theory and trace the noncommutative conjunc-
3For a rebuttal see W. Unruh’s article at URL = 〈 http://axion.physics.ubc.ca/rebel.html 〉.
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tive etymology within its logic to the sigma algebra of its Hilbert H
⋃
H ′ probability
space whose nondistributive syntax reveals the dispersive semantics that leads to the
conclusions of the logical no-go theorem:
realist interpretation ⇒ value-definiteness ⇒ dispersion-free mixtures ⇒
distributive logic ⇒ commutative logic ⇒ classical physics.
We follow up in the next section with an examination of the probability space of
compound noncommuting observations where we find a formally identical nondis-
tributivity relation which, in contrast to the previous relation, is grounded in the
metalanguage of the theory. There, the noncommuting ’conjunction’ appears as an
elementary or atomic event in the product H ×H ′ space [25]. In light of the appar-
ent distinct events they reference, we consider in the next section whether the two
relations might in fact correspond to the same physical property. We find that they
do not (at least from the relevant realist point of view), which then invalidates the
logical no-go theorem. And while both Bell and Bohn challenged this validity long
ago, their results were generally not well received at the time.
In addition to our adherence to an elementary exposition remaining within the
purview of undergraduate QM, another difference between the earlier analysis and
our approach is the region of analytic validity that we concede to the theorem;
we observe that the opposing views operate on distinct semantics that follow, in
one case, from the syntactic reduction of diatomic compound bivalent experimental
propositions, and in the other, from that of such propositions over their aggregates
(which are generally nonbivalent), then combined. This point of view offers we
think a more comprehensive understanding of the disagreement. We end in the final
section with a few concluding remarks on the theorem and related issues.
While the concepts central to the logical no-go theorem and quantum logic gener-
ally are fundamentally simple, they do involve a myriad of definitions and notations
unfamiliar to most students and non-specialists, although again, no single one of
these particularly difficult to grasp. It is also likely that many readers will first
6
encounter this article via an internet resource. For these reasons we make extensive
use of internet citations. We often point to Wolfram’s MathWorld and the Statistics
Glossary for clarifications and basic definitions in probability theory, and to the The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Philosophy Pages, and Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia for philosophical and historical contexts.
2 argument against hidden variables
With an aim to predict and finally manipulate physical events and processes, the
scientific enterprise proceeds on the implicit premise that given the relevant physical
laws and prevailing conditions, the occurrence of subsequent events may in principle
always be known beforehand. I.e., it proceeds on the premise that such physical laws
indeed exist and is thus fundamentally entrenched in the determinism hypothesis.
It is an irony then that the facilitating scientific method, famously successful in
hypothesis self-correction, is itself not subject to the same correction, as there is no
rule to tell us just when the determinism hypothesis breaks down, no negative test of
the hypothesis. The rule of practice, as part and parcel of the method itself, is that
the hypothesis never does breaks down; it is the unsatisfactory prediction itself that
motivates the search for causation, Newton pondering the fallen apple. The final
justification of the method rests, as always, in the likelihood of future discovery.
It is in the event of unknown and thus possibly nonexistent physical laws that the
program may run afoul the prevailing ”belief that natural science, based on observa-
tion, comprises the whole of human knowledge”, to quote from the Philosophy Pages
entry for Positivism [26], where in the extreme view further elaborated, whatever
the rational appeal or past successes of the determinism hypothesis, non-empirical
statements of all brands are metaphysical [27]. Upon this reasoning an epistimically
undetermined microscopic experimental outcome becomes, in accordance with von
Neumann’s reduction axiom and corroborating Copenhagen interpretation of QM,
ontologically indeterminate. But more on this later. It should at least be clear
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that a probabilistic theory understood also as complete (in respect of its account of
the physically objective world) such that empirical collective statistics at the same
time exhaustively characterize each collective-member also - such a theory naturally
assumes a strongly subjective (e.g. Bayesian) quality.
In our lead-up to the logical no-go derivation ( whose standard presentation is
couched in a specialized nomenclature), we first, in the next section introduce the
necessary experimental and formal terminology by way of considering an application
of the QM probability theory to a specific instance.
2.1 the structure of experimental outcomes
Let us consider a physical system and the set of experiments that may be performed
on it. To each experiment there corresponds an array of characteristic outcomes,
an experimental spectrum, which for a sufficiently large number of identical experi-
mental trials may then be mapped to a probability distribution, a state space, each
element of which being equal to the long-run relative frequency recorded for the
corresponding outcome. We consider the complete set of such distinct experimental
processes. To the compound mapping then there corresponds a parallel mapping
from experimental propositions (as we have seen, corresponding to outcome ’a’, the
proposition: ’the outcome is a’) to the interval [0,1], taken as a measure of the
truth of a given proposition: mapped to ’1’ for true, to ’0’ for not-true. And like
its experimental counterpart, this mapping too is generally non-injective [28], as
distinct experimental arrangements may sometimes yield identical results; i.e., out-
comes sometimes overlap (Classically, e.g., the ’weight’ measurement outcome for a
given mass on earth will be identical to the weight measurement, say on the moon,
of an entirely different mass.).
The sort of quantum experimental data that readily lends itself to this descrip-
tion is obtained from measurements of microscopic spin of the kind taken in Stern-
Gerlach (SG) experiments [29, 30]. There, an assemblage, or ensemble, of identically
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prepared particles is accelerated through a localized inhomogeneous magnetic field
from which they emerge with velocities in one of a discrete number of directions
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figure 1
a given direction characteristic of a particle’s spin projection along the SG symmetry
axis. We know however from experience with ordinary macroscopic spins and from
the predictions of classical electromagnetism that these directions should instead
vary continuously
  θmax
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z
figure 2
with limits determined by the spin magnitude and SG field strength. Microscopic
spins predictions are for this reason said to be ’quantized’, appearing, observed,
only in discrete amounts, and a SG experiment θ is thus characterized by its dis-
crete outcome set Ωθ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, ....θn}, with outcome probabilities given by the
experimental relative frequencies
P(θi) = pi = ni/n
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∑
ni = n, so that,
∑
pi = 1
where ni is the number of experimental trials with outcome θi , and n the total
number of trials in a given run [29].
In respect of the formal probability space (Ωθ,F,P), the probability measure P
maps F to the reals, P: F→ [1,0], where F is the sigma algebra generated by Ωθ, and
is thus composed of the closed unions of subsets of Ωθ, Ei
⋃
Ej , called events, where
E ⊆ Ω . Events then are sigma-measurable subsets and may always be expanded as
a finite union of outcomes
E = {θi}
⋃
{θj}
⋃
{θk} . . . = {θi, θj , θk, . . .}
for which expansion we use the notation
E = θi
⋃
θj
⋃
θk . . . (1)
Elements of Fare called the measurable or Borel sets pertaining to the given experi-
ment, while the probability measure P has the property P(Ei
⋃
Ej) = P(Ei)+P(Ej)
whenever events Ei and Ej are disjoint, denoted, Ei ⊥ Ej [31]. Then with
F = {θ1, θ2, θ3, . . . , θn, θ1
⋃
θ2, θ1
⋃
θ3, . . . , θi
⋃
θj
⋃
θk, . . . . . . , θ1
⋃
θ2
⋃
. . .
⋃
θn}
single element events, here θ1, θ2, and θ3, represent individual experimental outcomes
and are said to be atomic or elementary; they are the primitive elements of the
probability theory, external inputs of a truth value status independent of the theory,
while the general F element represents combinations of individual outcomes. As an
experimental probability mapping is characteristic of the corresponding ensemble
of observations, distinct formal probability functions P may be taken to represent
distinct states of the ensemble.
It is possible to generalize the outcome set by taking at once the union of all
outcome sets, Ωθ → Ωθ
⋃
Ωϕ
⋃
Ωχ
⋃
. . . = X, called the outcome space [16] 4.
Ω→ X = {θ1, θ2, θ3, . . . , θn, ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, . . . , ϕn, χ1, χ2, χ3, . . . , χn, . . . . . .} (2)
4One might well question whether the criterion of ”generalization” is met here. More on this
later
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A peculiarity of measurements on microscopic ensembles is the absence of experimen-
tal mappings P: X → {1,0 } such that all ensemble members have, simultaneously,
all the same projections. The phenomena is called dispersion; thus, all microscopic
ensembles are observed to be dispersive [5].
2.2 formal structures in a Hilbert space
It happens that the forgoing formal relations are structured in a manner similar to
those among the elements in a vector space. We consider then an n-dimensional
Hilbert space (H-space) spanned by the representative basis
Ω = {|1〉, |2〉, |3〉, . . . , |n〉}
The span of this basis, comprised of all possible linear combinations, α1|1〉+α2|2〉+
α3|3〉+ . . .+αn|n〉, where the αi are complex numbers, constitutes the H-space itself.
Among the basis elements are the structural relations [32]
〈i|j〉 = δij (orthonormalization)
∑
|i〉〈i| = In×n (completeness)
by means of which one orthonormal basis is related to another: |j′〉 = In×n|j
′〉 =
(
∑
|i〉〈i|)|j′〉 =
∑
〈i|j′〉|i〉 =
∑
cj′i|i〉. To each unit element then there corresponds
a characteristic operator that projects any H-space vector |ψ〉 onto and so defines a
unique subspace, (|k〉〈k|)|ψ〉 = ckψ|k〉, for some ckψ < 1. The operator Pk = |k〉〈k|,
thus projects an arbitrary vector onto the Hk subspace {|k〉}, and is known as a
projection operator
Pk|ψ〉 = ckψ|k〉 .
The complete H-space is then a formal union of such subspaces
H = H1
⋃
H1
⋃
H2
⋃
H3
⋃
. . .Hn
= Hi
⋃
H′i
where H′i here is the H space relative complement [48] to the Hi subspace.
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2.3 semantical rules
When we now assign an experimental outcome set to an orthonormal basis, Ω ∼ Ω,
and thus X ∼ H , we identify a pre-measured state such as ψ in figure1 with an
expanded vector in this basis
ψ ∼ |ψ〉 =
∑
ciψ|i〉 (3)
∑
c2iψ = 1
and obtain the experimental statistics, the observed distribution, P: Ω → {pi}, by
means of the scalar product 〈ψ|j〉 as
pi = |〈ψ|i〉|
2 .
Further, the observed ensemble dispersion manifests here as the nonexistence of
H-space vectors |φ〉 having the property
〈n′|φ〉 = 0 or 1, for alln′
In other words, there can be no probability measure, no state, with the property,
Pψ : H → {0, 1}.
In terms of projectors, the previous H-space structure relations become
PiPj = δijPj (orthonormalization)
∑
Pi = In×n (completeness)
pi = |〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉|
The main advantage of this formulation lies in the correspondence between pro-
jection operators and experimental propositions. The projectors are QM operators
with eigenvalue set {0,1}, so that as a projector corresponds to an experimental
proposition, (θi ∼ |i〉 ∼ Pi), its eigenvalue corresponds to the proposition’s truth
value: ’1’ for ’true’, ’0’ for ’false’; likewise, as the probability pi gives the projection
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of |ψ〉 along |i〉, the corresponding projector maps to the proposition θi , the propo-
sition that Pψ ⊆ Pi(Hψ ⊆ Hi). As a consequence, in this vector-space formulation
of states we have that
Pi ⊆ Ij(Hi ⊆ Hj
⋃
H ′j), for all θi and ϕj
whereas in a vector-set formulation we have, as in set theory, θi ⊆ (ϕj
⋃
ϕ′j), only in
the event that either θi ⊆ ϕj or θi ⊆ ϕ
′
j .
2.4 logical structure of micro-events
By the logical structure of microscopic events we refer the interrelations among the
propositions that assert the occurrence of such events. And as to each individual
experimental outcome there is assigned a yes-no probability distribution, to the cor-
responding proposition is assigned a truth-value distribution, the two distributions,
presumably, being one and the same.
Among experimental propositions, and propositions in general, there are ordering
relations of implication, such that the truth of one proposition may imply that of
another. This relation is typically expressed in the notation of naive set theory as
set inclusion, θi ⊆ ϕj , here θi implying ϕj. Whereas an equivalence of propositions,
θi = ϕj, simply represents the combined orderings θi ⊆ ϕj and ϕj ⊆ θi. Consider
for example a case in which two volumes physically overlap, Va ⊆ Vb, and the
proposition a (b): the particle is in volume Va(b). It is then by self-evident tautology
that, a ⊆ b, and the relation is said to be analytic. On the other hand, there are
many relations among propositions, also empirical, such as may embody e.g. the
observation of a physical regularity or law and do not involve tautology. For example,
given propositions a: the object is released from a height h, and b: the object reaches
the ground in th seconds, an ordering, b ⊆ a, might express an instance of Newton’s
law of gravity. Such relations as these are synthetic [33]. In both cases, a is said
to be a lower bound of b in the ordering a ⊆ b. In the set theoretic notation, the
conjunction and intersection of propositions a
⋃
b and a
⋂
b, are then taken to be
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greatest lower bound (glb) and lowest upper bound (lub) of ’a or b’ and ’a and b’,
respectively, and are said to be true whenever ’a is true or b is true’ and ’a is true
and b is true’.
The complete set of propositions bearing on the experiments that may be per-
formed on a given physical system constitute a proposition system with structural
properties characteristic, presumably, of the physical system itself. As it happens,
the truth structure of the conjunction of two propositions is all important to a
derivation of the logical no-go theorem. In most analysis, the conjunction of any
two experimental propositions is again an experimental proposition having a truth
structure given by the following rule:
Let I be an index set and {ai}(i ∈ I) any subset of L, ai ∈ L. Then there
exists a proposition, denoted by
⋂
I ai with the property
x ⊆ ai for all i ∈ I ↔ x ⊆
⋂
I ai
”axiom II” as it appears in Jauch’s QM text [17]; the proposition system that satisfies
this rule is then shown to have the structure of a mathematical lattice [14, 17, 18, 19]
with
a ⊆ a for all a ∈ L ;
a ⊆ b and b ⊆ a implies a = b ;
a ⊆ b and b ⊆ c implies a ⊆ c.
To every a ∈ L there exists another proposition a′ ∈ L with
(a′)′ = a ;
a′
⋂
a = ⊘ ;
a ⊆ b↔ b′ ⊆ a′.
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The axiom is assumed valid for experimental propositions in respect of both ordinary
macroscopic and microscopic systems [1]. What sets one type apart from the other
are the ordering relations between propositions that bear on experiments that do
not commute, compound measurements for which the temporal order of component
application has an effect on the eventual component outcomes. For example, if
on a single physical system we perform the experimental sequence, θϕθ, resulting
in θ outcomes θi and θj that are not equal, i 6= j, then experiments θ and ϕ, and
corresponding propositions, do not commute and are said to be incompatible. While
the noncommutivity of measurements on microscopic systems is readily observed, the
term ’classical’, sometimes ascribed to macroscopic systems, refer properly, rather,
very specifically to measurements, experiments, that commute: classical system ∼
commutative measurements on system.
2.5 classical versus quantum logical structures
The truth structure of classical syntactically compound experimental propositions
is given by implicit set theoretic rules such as the law of distribution
θi
⋂
(θj
⋃
θ′j) = (θi
⋂
θj)
⋃
(θi
⋂
θ′j) (4)
nicely illustrated by means of Venn diagrams
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where the shaded spatial areas are correlated to set size, hence to probability. A
system of propositions obeying relation (4) is said to be Boolean (or classical) [34].
It was the mathematician and pioneering quantum theorist Von Neumann who
long ago first observed that mutually noncommuting propositions generally do not
satisfy the relation [35]. Thus, propositional systems that refer to classical phenom-
ena are distributive, while those that refer to microscopic phenomena are nondis-
tributive. Given the significance of this distinction, it is worth taking a close look
at Von Neumann’s argument as it appears in his The Logic of Quantum Mechanics
[35]: ”...These facts suggest that the distributive law may break down in quantum
mechanics. That it does break down is shown by the fact that if a denotes the ex-
perimental observation of a wave-packet ϕ on one side of a plane in ordinary space,
a´ correspondingly the observation of ϕ on the other side, and b the observation of
ϕ in a state symmetric about the plane, then (as one can readily check)”
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a = a
⋂
(b
⋃
b′) 6= (a
⋂
b)
⋃
(a
⋂
b′) (5)
since, actually, (a
⋂
b) = 0 when a and b are non-collinear. Another version of the
argument in terms of spin measurement appears in Jammer’s Philosophy of Quan-
16
tum Mechanics [36]. From this we see that while the logical matrix of microscopic
phenomena affirms the law of the excluded middle according to which the proposi-
tion, I = a
⋃
a’ (a or not-a ), the proposition of ’identity’, is always true, it denies
the law of bivalence by virte of which exactly one of the propositions ’a’ or ’not-a’
is of necessity true [37].
2.6 logical no-go theorem
With the necessary machinery now in place it is here that we encounter a possible
conflict with the notion common to realist thinking that to experimental processes
there are causes that determine their outcomes with certainty 5; here, the beginnings
to the logical no-go. By means of this determinism experimental outcomes may in
principle always be known prior to measurement, so that future tensed propositions
are at all times bivalent, either true or false; hence, the realist principle of value-
definiteness [36, 10, 39]. But the set of all microscopic ensemble measurements, as
we have seen, is empirically dispersive
σ(a) ≡ P(a)− P2(a) 6= 0 for at least some propositions a
which then casts the realist ensemble as an assemblage of similarly prepared though
non-identical entities, as a ’mixture’ of dispersion-free sub-ensembles whose mea-
surement yet yield the necessary (observed) noncommutivity of incompatible ob-
servables. Let us point out that this realist view contrasts the previously given
’conventional’ view where ensemble dispersion appears rather as a direct manifesta-
tion of non-bivalent experimental values possessed not only by the assemblage, but
by its individual members also. In any event, realist dispersive ensemble states, ω,
are then linear sums of nondispersive sub-ensemble states, ωi .
ω =
∑
αiωi for some complex numbers αi
5By realism we mean simply the realism e.g. characteristic of the EPR elements of reality [38, 36]
which presupposes determinism as a sufficient condition [9], characteristic also of observables in
Bell’s theorem
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with, for each ωi
ωi(a)− ω
2
i (a) = 0 for all propositions a
together forming a convex set [16, 17, 40]. From this constraint on realist nondis-
persive subensembles, ωi(a) = 1 or 0, for all propositions a, it is easy to show by
direct substitution into (4) that every definite truth-value combination correspond-
ing to the set of definite values possessed by a given subensemble affirms the law
of distribution. I.e., given propositions a and b and every possible definite value
assignment, a, b ∈ {0,1}, we find for each case
a
⋂
(b
⋃
b′) = (a
⋂
b)
⋃
(a
⋂
b′)
The relation holds, recall, only in the case that measurements corresponding to con-
stituent propositions commute. Given that microscopic measurements generally do
not commute the realist hv interpretation of QM and its description of the micro-
scopic data is placed at direct odds with observation, thus concluding the logical
no-go proof.
realist interpretation ⇒ value-definiteness ⇒ dispersion-free mixtures ⇒
distributive logic ⇒ commutative ⇒ classical.
In the words of its authors, ”Loosely stated, the main result [of the theorem] is
simply this: if there exist incompatible observables then hidden variables are not
possible.” Notwithstanding critical appraisals from Bohm and later Bell (and sadly,
few others), which we discuss in a later section, at the time of publication this
pronouncement on hidden variables enjoyed unanimous approval.
3 physical and logical conjunctions
The inadmissibility of realist hv’s on the grounds of non-classical commutivity is
deduced it might have been noticed from no more than a glancing account of the
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phenomena of noncommutivity itself; our fig 4, for instance, which illustrates the
argument connecting noncommutation with nondistributivity advanced by von Neu-
mann depicts no explicit noncommutation.
3.1 joint probabilities
The noncommutivity of measurements is a phenomena that necessarily involves the
application of consecutive experiments on individual physical systems. An instance
of this we denote by the inequation, ϕjθi 6= θiϕj , where the spatial order of propo-
sitions here, right to left, represents the temporal order of experiment application.
In words, the proposition that the compound experimental outcome is a then b gen-
erally has a different truth value from the proposition that the outcome is b then
a. For comparison with fig 1 we illustrate an experimental arrangement for which
noncommutivity effects are common.
  ϕ
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figure 5
Here the experimental outcome space may be given as the complete set of possible
single SG measurement outcome combinations {θiϕj , θiϕ
′
j, θ
′
iϕj, θ
′
iϕ
′
j} ( or as the
set {ϕj, ϕ
′
j} in terms of marginal outcomes ) whose probabilities contribute to the
marginal probability
P(ϕj) = P(θiϕj) + P(θ
′
iϕj) = P(ϕj |θi)/P(θi) + P(ϕj |θ
′
i)/P(θ
′
i)
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The above expression P(α|β) here represents a conditional probability: the truth
value of proposition α on the condition that proposition β with regard to the same
physical system has truth value 1 [41]. An exchange of labels in figure 5, θ ↔ ϕ,
obtains the converse marginal probability
P(θi) = P(ϕjθi) + P(ϕ
′
jθi) = P(θi|ϕj)/P(ϕj) + P(θi|ϕ
′
j)/P(ϕ
′
j). (6)
With these definitions quantum mechanics predicts and experiment confirms that
in general
P(ϕj |θi)/P(θi) 6= P(θi|ϕj)/P(ϕj) . (7)
And yet from the same probability calculus we have the identity
P(ϕj|θi)/P(θi) = P(θi|ϕj)/P(ϕj) ≡ P(θi
⋂
ϕj) . (8)
in which the expression to the far right is known as the joint probability for propo-
sitions θi and ϕj. The discrepancy between (7) and (8) is an expression of the well
know fact that joint probabilities, by definition symmetric, θi
⋂
ϕj = ϕj
⋂
θi, do not
exist for mutually noncommuting experimental arrangements 6; the experimental de-
termination of one distribution fundamentally disturbs the other [20, 21, 22, 23, 24],
a case of which illustrated here Venn diagrams
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figure 6
6for a discussion in terms of corresponding random variables see ref. [42]
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so that ϕjθi 6= θiϕj , propositions θi and ϕj noncommuting.
3.2 nondistribution of probability
There is thus an ambiguity when signifying the conditional probabilities of non-
commuting propositions in the usual set theoretic notation . The notation is also
standard to classical logic whose matrix of propositions, like that of naive set the-
ory, lacks the temporal ordering of events needed to account for noncommutivity.
Martin Strauss, a natural philosopher who has written extensively on the subject of
QM interpretation, long ago made the point that, ”Classical probability based on
the usual propositional calculus which is isomorphic to the set-theoretic system of
subsets of a given set has for its probability functions a domain which is likewise
isomorphic to the system, and assumes therefore the simultaneous decidability of
any two propositions...”, the quote taken from Jammer [36]. In a more suitable
though unfortunately less common notation we have that P(ϕj |θi)/P(θi) ≡ P(θi, ϕj)
[43], so that
P(θi, ϕj) = P(ϕj, θi) ≡ P(θi
⋂
ϕ′j), only in the event that θiϕj = ϕjθi .
On the other hand, from Eqn (6) we have the always valid identity
P(θi) = P(ϕj , θi) + P(ϕ
′
j, θi)
although, again, generally
P(θi) 6= P(θi
⋂
ϕj) + P(θi
⋂
ϕ′j) . (9)
Relation (9) states a nondistribution, a violation of the usual distribution of relative
probabilities. As the noncommuting conjunction itself, θi
⋂
ϕj , does not exist as an
experimental proposition [21, 23, 24], the nondistribution is based ontologically.
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3.3 syntactic and semantic conjunction
In the nondistributive relation of the preceding section, Eqn. (5), the conjunction
appears as a syntactic construct, an element in the object language of an X-space
generated sigma-algebra, whereas above in (9) the conjunction corresponds to an
atomic event and thus enjoys the status of a primitive whose semantics derive entirely
within the meta-language of the probability theory [36, 44]. As classical probability
spaces are induced by their corresponding experimental outcome sets [42], the for-
mer syntactic conjunction belongs to one probability space (an H
⋃
H ′ subspace),
the latter semantic conjunction to another (product of subspaces, H × H ′, itself
however not a product space [17, 45]). This unfortunate formal mis-identification
has not helped resolve confusions in an already contentious QM interpretations de-
bate [46]. Let us be especially clear on the point we have just made: It is the
syntactic nondistributivity of propositions, equation (5), that characterizes classical
or Boolean logic,
syntactically distributive logic ⇒ classical logic
whereas the semantic nondistributivity of probabilistic measurements, equation (9),
is characteristic of noncommutative or ’classical’ probability,
semantically distributive probability ⇒ classical probability.
Whether the two relations express the same physics is a question taken up in the
next section.
3.4 philosophical differences
Several adherents to the conventional interpretation such as von Neumann, Piron,
and Jammer have offered specific examples of the physics behind the noncommu-
tative conjunction. Bohm, Bub and Bell in response maintain by means of other
semantics that such a conjunction does not exist, that there can be no physical cor-
respondence: To quote Bohm ”...a and b, represented by noncommuting projection
22
operators, can both be true with certainty if they are confirmed as such by cor-
responding processes, whereas (because of interference) no process exists to verify
the proposition a
⋂
b. In this case ω(a
⋂
b) = 0 without excluding the possibility
ω(a) = ω(b) = 1 ” [21]. On the other hand, it appears to be clear that upon the
criteria set down by von Neumann and others, the conditions, ω(a) = ω(b) = 1,
have the very meaning, ω(a
⋂
b) = 1 ... And then from Bell, ”We are not deal-
ing in B [a system of experimental propositions] with logical propositions, but with
measurements involving for example differently oriented magnets. The axiom [if
〈a〉 = 〈b〉 = 1, then 〈a
⋂
b〉 = 1 ] holds for quantum mechanical states. But it is
a quite peculiar property of them and in no way a necessity of thought”. Both
criticisms appearing within the context of their respective refutations of the logical
no-go theorem are it seems well-founded, though they might have been better, more
effectively, put within the context of a larger, more comprehensive assessment of the
logical no-go theorem, within the context of a kind of critical analysis that of the
Bell’s theorem, e.g., may be found everywhere [8, 9] 7.
7Bohm might have added within this context ’that propositions cannot be decided upon simul-
taneously (as with the incompatible semantic conjunction) does not impose that they are simul-
taneously undecidable (as in the case of the incompatible syntactic conjunction)’, or Bell, that
’the impossibility of simultaneous incompatible measurements (as in the case of the incompatible
semantic conjunction, 〈a
⋂
b〉 = 0) does not preclude the simultaneous possibility of incompatible
measurements (as in the case of the incompatible syntactic conjunction 〈a〉, 〈b〉 6= 0)’ . And so
forth. As it happened, each man instead wage direct assaults on the notion of realist semantic
distributivity without shedding much light on the seeming validity of syntactic distributivity, i.e.
without resolving the confusion between the two relations, a confusion that persists to this day.
The same may be said in respect of Strauss’s ’complementary logic’ [23] and Suppes’s later ver-
sion, both of which effectively make the point though without an adequate appreciation for the
distinction between compound and elementary ’events’, syntactic and semantic conjunction.... and
consequently confounding the notion of the ’classical’ - of classical logic with classical physics. This,
from the syntactic rule of Strauss (long before the work of Bohm and Bell) to Gudder’s restriction
to experimental questions [22] and several analysis that have appeared since. It comes as little
surprise that with few exceptions it is syntactic distributivity that holds the interest of mathe-
matics and philosophy (as evidenced in the works of mathematicians and philosophers), while the
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The logical no-go theorem mistakes syntactic distributivity for semantic distribu-
tivity and thus confounds the realist notion of deterministically possessed values
with the notion of the commutation of incompatible experiments. While the two
are certainly conceptually distinct, there remains the possibility that the relations
are empirically related.
4 reconsideration of the argument
Then what of the syntactic nondistributivity at the heart of the logical no-go the-
orem? What does it signify, and what, physically, would constitute an instance of
it; how might such an instance be confirmed or refuted? The answer to these ques-
tions, as anticipated in the previous section, supervenes on the precise semantics
associated with the noncommutative conjunction, for which, as initial guidance we
may take the examples offered separately by von Neumann, Piron and Jammer.
4.1 syntactic and semantic physical distinction
We consider an experiment in which the incompatible observables, a and b, are
randomly sampled over an ensemble of ’identical’ systems - an ensemble. Then,
according to our three authors, given a sufficiently large sample we should never
find that both P(a) = 0 or 1 and P(b) = 0 or 1. I.e., we should never find that for
each proposition, a and b, the individual measurement outcomes are all identical,
either all yes, or all no. The equation, P(a
⋂
b) = 0, thus states an instance of
this, of the impossibility of finding the ensemble simultaneously in eigenstates of
propositions a and b. But clearly, this is identical to the condition of dispersion
itself, and furthermore does in no obvious way speak to the relevant question of
measurement noncommutivity. Might these simple points have escaped their notice.
empirically inclined experimentalists have concerned themselves primarily with the semantic, as
only the semantic noncommutative conjunction meets the criteria to describe physical events (or
non-events) [47]
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Probably not. It is more likely that our authors thought it reasonable to require
of realist outcome states the same statistics as QM eigenstates. We illustrate the
assumption for nondispersive state ψ with truth value 1 for experimental proposition
θi ( and also ϕj by simply making the exchanges, θ ↔ ϕ and i↔ j )
  ψθ
  θ
z
  ψ   θi
  | ψθ > = | i >
figure 7
Then, PjPi|ψ〉 = Pj|i〉 and PiPj |ψ〉 = Pi|j〉, from which we have the probability
relation, P(θiϕj) = P(ϕjθi), same as for the case of QM states under the operation
of mutually commuting experiments. There is however no reason a priori to require
such statistics of subensembles of dispersion-free states, and it is easy to construct
an empirically consistent measurement picture in which they would not hold, as
the time evolution of a nondispersive state may depend, very reasonably, upon the
measurements performed on the representative system. Then by parameters λθϕ
and λϕθ let us denote this dependence in the case of two noncommutative temporal
sequences of experiments θ and ϕ , and relate the state of the system prior to
measurement, ψ(t), to its state following measurement, ψ(t’), by means of a time
evolution operator U which propagates the state vector from t to t’ : ψ(t)→ ψ(t′) =
U(λθϕ; t
′, t)ψ(t), U(λϕθ; t
′, t)ψ(t). These then describe the two distinct subensemble
experimental processes
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So that while each initial subensemble is nondispersive, ω1,2(θi), ω1,2(ϕj) = 1 or 0
(though with a combined non-zero dispersion: ω(θi), ω(ϕj) 6= 1 or 0 ), in violation
of syntactic nondistributivity, eqn.(5), the consecutive measurement of incompatible
propositions here maintain noncommutivity, P(θiϕj) 6= P(ϕjθi), thus satisfying the
constraints of semantic nondistributivity, eqn. (9), the one condition thus indepen-
dent of the other.
In addition, this constraint linking nondistributivity to noncommutivity and nec-
essary to the logical no-go theorem is not amenable to empirical testing, as the
nondispersive ensembles themselves exist solely as hypotheticals, within abstract
partitions of the physical dispersive ensembles of experience. To again quote Bell
[20], there is ’no necessity of thought’ by which dispersionless subensembles must
obey the statistics of QM, none then leading from nondispersion to commutivity,
a violation of one not infringing upon the possible validity of the other. We may
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well accept then the existence of syntactically distributive, hence nondispersive,
subensembles without contravening their semantic nondistributivity, i.e. the non-
commutivity of incompatible measurements performed on all subensembles. This
assertion, let us be clear, is at odds with the claim made by Jauch and Piron in
Ref.[14] that ’The detailed analysis of this relation [syntactic distributivity] shows
that it has exactly the properties one would associate with measurements which
can be performed simultaneously without disturbing each other [noncommutivity].’,
which continues, ’For instance, if the propositions are represented by projection op-
erators in a Hilbert space ..... ’. As it turns out, the cited ”instance” serves also as
the sole ’detailed analysis’ ever offered or referenced by the authors in support of the
claim, and it seems indeede the only one available. Thus, the statistical constraint
implicit to the logical no-go theorem and imposed on nondispersive states rests fi-
nally on the premise that all states are quantum mechanical and hence dispersive.
The argument is remarkable in its blatant circularity: All states dispersive → No
states nondispersive. Unlike the hv’s argument advanced by von Neumann, however,
recognized only a full 30 years after publication as simple fallacy, this basic circular-
ity in the logical no-go argument did not long go unnoticed and was at publication
quickly pointed out (in another context) by Bohm [21, 42] among others.
4.2 formal refutation
To continue one more, this problem with the logical no-go may also be understood
from a more formal standpoint, physical considerations aside. The law of distribu-
tion holds whenever its components are sets, though not when they are spaces, as
formally defined. In fact, when we faithfully respect component status the nondis-
tributivity inequality (5) is immediately made distributive. Generally, given any
outcome space X =
⋃
αΩα = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, . . .} :
a = a
⋂
I
= a
⋂
(b
⋃
b′)
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= (a
⋂
b)
⋃
(a
⋂
b′)
= (a
⋂
b)
⋃
[a
⋂
(a
⋃
c
⋃
d
⋃
e
⋃
f
⋃
g
⋃
h
⋃
. . .)]
= (a
⋂
b)
⋃
a
⋂
(a
⋃
c
⋃
d
⋃
e
⋃
f
⋃
g
⋃
h
⋃
. . .)
= a
⋂
[(a
⋂
a′)
⋃
(b
⋂
b′)
⋃
(c
⋂
c′)
⋃
(d
⋂
d′)
⋃
. . .]
= (a
⋂
a)
⋃
(a
⋂
a′)
⋃
(a
⋂
b)
⋃
(a
⋂
b′)
⋃
(a
⋂
c)
⋃
(a
⋂
c′)
⋃
(a
⋂
d)
⋃
(a
⋂
d′)
⋃
. . .
= a (10)
where, (a
⋂
x) = 0 whenever, a 6= x.
Syntactic nondistribution formally proceeds then from a set theoretic inconsis-
tency, where the compliment-defining universal set [48] on the rhs of (5) is outcome
set Ωb = {b1, b2, b3, . . . , bn}, but on the lhs is taken to be the outcome space X, thus
yielding the (5) inequality
a
⋂
(b
⋃
b′X) 6= a
⋂
(b
⋃
b′Ω) = a
⋂
b+ a
⋂
b′Ω = 0 + 0 whenever a
⋂
Ωb = 0.
Physically, of course, b
⋃
b′X is not an experimental proposition.
Alternatively, we may assign the inconsistency to the connective conjunction
itself,
⋃
, which joins two propositions on one side of (5) to give their (QM) span,
while on the other their usual set theoretic (classical) union [49].
In addition to the critical analysis of Bohm, the philosopher Popper was also
quick to weigh in, pointing out, in a lively exchange with the logical no-go au-
thors an inconsistency in their reasoning [50]. Though certainly blatant ( (b
⋃
b′)→
(b
⋃
b′X) = (b
⋃
b′) , nothing more, writes Pooper, than ’a simple slip’) the mis-
representation is obscured by its logical idiom. Now at a safe distance one may
appreciate the extent to which this notational slip accommodates the interpretation
of the Copenhagen school: As Ω here designates the set of possible outcomes of an
experiment performed on an individual ensemble member, e.g. on an individual par-
ticle, their truth values in the realist interpretation bivalent, the outcome space X,
on the other hand, as a union of such outcome sets,
⋃
n Ωn, then designates the set of
possible outcomes corresponding to groups of experiments performed upon groups
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of individual systems, upon ensembles, their truth values in any interpretation gen-
erally non-bivalent. To substitute one for the other here would be to mistakenly
impose a constraint existing within one interpretation, the orthodox interpretation,
in the course of eveluating an opposing interpretation, the realist interpretation
[42]... ; formal sets always satisfy relation (5), spaces generally do not, and the very
possibility of a consistent realist interpretation is immediately ruled out when it is
assumed that H-space vectors represent all possible physical states. And so, again,
the circularity.
5 summary and conclusions
We have shown that the logical no-go theorem involves the fallacy which argues that
the empirical validity of QM maintains only to the exclusion of other descriptions,
specifically, to the exclusion of a presumably more complete realist hv theory, that
because observed ensemble states are all quantum mechanical, so too must their
constituent subensembles down to the single element be. The theorem assumes, in
the words of Bohm, ”that the current linguistic structure of QM is the only one that
can be used correctly to describe the empirical facts underlying the theory” [21],
but from Bell, ”only QM averages over the dispersion free states need produce this
[observed statistical] property.”
5.1 differing views on probability theory
If one accepts the proposition that qm states and observables refer solely to ensem-
bles and their averages - a proposition accepted, in fact, by all practicing experimen-
talists as operationally valid - there opens the possibility of the existence of a distinct
underlying individual ensemble-member reality, much as the Newtonian reality of
individual systems underlies the dynamics of statistical mechanics, as the individual
molecular reality of mutual electromagnetic interactions underlies the ideal gas law,
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etc. Such is a frequentist understanding of QM probabilities as nothing more than
the relative frequencies of ensemble measurement outcomes. This is the view taken
e.g. in Ballentine’s statistical or ensemble interpretation of QM [51, 52] where the
absence of a exhaustive description of individual ensemble member reality casts QM
as a theory incomplete and possibly provisional, as an approximation to a more
complete theory, again, much as statistical mechanics is incomplete with respect to
Newtonian mechanics. This was also generally the view of QM statistics held by
Einstein [52].
From an opposing point of view, QM probabilities refer rather to individual
events, to the outcomes of individual measurements made upon individual ensemble
members. In this case, empirical ensemble frequencies relate to the ’likelihoods’ of
particular individual outcomes. Thus, the non-bivalence ordinarily characteristic of
ensemble propositions are immediately manifest in the propositions regarding mea-
surements on individual ensemble members. And so, to refer back to the experiment
of fig. 1, not only is the spin projection of a particle not known before it has been
measured (epistemically non-existent), but at such a stage the particle does not
properly possess a spin (ontologically non-existent); it may only be said that the
particle possesses a kind of likelihood that a given projection outcome will be ob-
tained upon measurement. Such is a subjective Bayesian view of probability [53, 54]
and is more or less in line with the orthodox interpretation of QM as a statistical
though physically complete theory.
When experiments share a common outcome, i.e., when their outcome sets over-
lap, the theory predicts and experiment verifies that the relative frequencies for
those outcomes are equivalent, independent of experimental context. This peculiar
noncontextual behavior of microscopic ensemble statistics thus becomes by interpre-
tation characteristic also of individual microscopic measurements: propositionally,
θi
⋂
Ωθ = ϕj
⋂
Ωϕ in the event that we have physically θi = ϕj.
30
5.2 noncontextual probability space X
The conventional interpretation necessary to the logical no-go theorem is effectively
axiomatized by means of the probability space transformation (2), {Ωn} →
⋃
nΩn =
X . Earlier we spoke of this as a ”generalization” of the probability theory, but the
term is not really appropriate here, as the loss of generality is indeed enormous;
rather, the probability mapping is now specialized to the case of noncontextual
outcomes. The famous theorem of Gleason [55] illustrates the point: Given the class
of outcome sets Ωn of rank > 3, it is not possible while also respecting the empirical
sum rules, P(Ωn) = 1, i. e., P(Ωn
⋂
X) = 1 for all Ωn, to map the corresponding
propositions to a bivalent state space, P : X → {0,1}. It thus follows from the
harmless identity beginning our equation (10)
a = a
⋂
(b
⋃
b′)
that
P(a) = P[a
⋂
(b
⋃
b′)] for all a
constraining at least some of our propositions, a ∈ Ωa, to now non-bivalent truth
values - a constraint, when individual measurement outcomes are assumed indepen-
dent of experimental context, strictly enforced by Gleason’s theorem. The probabil-
ity space transformation, this generalization, affects also of course a corresponding
shift in the logical form of the involved experimental propositions, a shift from the
properly conditional propositions of experimental physics (with experimental con-
texts antecedently given or understood. E.g., a proposition ai which says that an
outcome ai will be obtained when or if an Ωa experiment is performed) to proposi-
tions that are categorical. Thus from propositions epistemic to those whose claims
are ontological [56] 8. When with this noncontextuality (which, again, constrains
8Classically, this amounts to taking weight rather than mass as an intrinsic property of a body.
In practice, the intrinsic masses are indeed determined, typically, from weight measurements,
though not without the law of gravity and a consideration of experimental context (mass of the
planet on which the weight measurement is taken)
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a propositional equivalence θi = ϕj, whenever holds the physical outcome equiv-
alence θi = ϕj ) is assumed in addition the principle of the value definiteness,
P(θi),P(ϕj) ∈ {0, 1}, which holds for realist dispersion-free states, we have that the
outcome of a measurement θi taken in the experimental context θ is the same as
it would have been had the measurement been taken instead in the experimental
context ϕ
  θj
  θ   ϕ
z
  ϕj
figure 9
a statement of the counterfactual definiteness of events, often understood under
appropriate conditions as a formulation of determinism [57, 10].
This is also the constraint at the heart of the later and related no-go theorem
of Kochen and Specker [58, 39, 10]. To briefly state, the KS analysis assumes as
a necessary element to any consistent realist view the noncontextual embedding of
QM observables in a nondispersive theory by means of the map, P( Ωn
⋂
X ) = 1
for all Ωn (respecting sum rules). But Gleason’s already analytically rules out the
possibility of such an embedding 9. Interest in the KS analysis itself however persists
9It is remarkable that some, particularly mathematicians, seem at an utter loss why anyone
would want to imagine a contextual embedding, X → {Ωn}; physicists generally have less trouble.
Remarkable that anyone, including mathematicians [59], would think a value-definite embedding
of QM observables necessary to a realist hv interpretation, a realist reading that begins, after all,
with the set of physical outcome sets {Ωn}. But the thinking is not so uncommon as one might
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to this day, and its relevant issues are taken up by the writer in separate paper [10].
5.3 further speculations
In respect of the KS analysis, let us add here briefly one telling point of reference.
While the system of micro-experimental propositions in the work of Jauch and Piron
has a nondistributive, non-Boolean structure, and forms a complete orthocomple-
mented lattice, the QM logic of Kochen and Specker, on the other hand, is structured
partially distributive, partially Boolean, and forms an orthocoherent orthoalgebra
[16, 58]. Consider with this the existence of several well-known deterministic models
of microscopic phenomena that also account for the noncommutation of incompati-
ble observables (e.g., the famous model by Bohm [61] or a more recent one by Aerts
[62]), of the presence of an elephant in the room, and it is obvious that it is not
a question of the nondispersion or the noncommutivity of measurements that is at
the heart of popular dissatisfaction with ”classical” readings of QM; here, the ’logi-
cal’ approach to the question of hv’s misses the point. What is seminal to popular
anti-classical sentiment in the case of QM interpretations and in the natural sciences
generally is an enduring suspicion of the scientific enterprise that explains, predicts,
and manipulates [63, 64] by virtue of the properly ’Classical’ operational hypoth-
esis according to which physical causes are by nature nomologically epistemic [65]
hope. At least not so in the opinion of S. Goldstein [60]: ” In view of the radical character of
quantum philosophy, the arguments offered in support of it have been surprisingly weak. More
remarkable still is the fact that it is not at all unusual, when it comes to quantum philosophy,
to find the very best physicists and mathematicians making sharp emphatic claims, almost of a
mathematical character, that are trivially false and profoundly ignorant.” An exception are the
views expressed by philosopher H. Stein who in 1970 writes, ”There is no obvious way to interpret
eventualities [QM projectors] as units of discourse, except under the conditions of a test realizing
them (when an eventuality may be correlated with the proposition that that eventuality holds);
but the eventualities realized together in any experiment have ordinary Boolean logical relations
to one another, so that no non-standard logic here comes into play” [54]
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- i.e., lawlike - and consequently deterministic 10. This, even against the stringent
empiricism insisted upon by so many founders of the quantum theory. Such as that
of W. Heisenberg [66], who was happy to evoke this kind argument in defense of
a QM completeness under threat 11, suggesting a certain determinism (excuse me,
determination) on the part of the anti-realist, the anti-determinist camp. That this
does indeed appear to be the central issue in dispute is rarely noted in the literature
(See e.g. Ref.[22]), and on those occasions, as here, only in passing.
Of the three impossibility proofs we have mentioned only Bell’s examines the hv
idea on the relevant question of determinism; it is also the simplest of the three.
Increasingly it is this theorem like the man that is the most interesting and com-
pelling. A definitive test of the inequality however (notwithstanding a chorus of
10- a synonymy embedded in everyday usage: The official speaking on behalf of BP oil company
in a news report on a recent refinery accident (24 March 05) assures the public that they will find
out ”why it took place, what were the causes”.
11What the student and non-specialist may find alarming - what alarms the writer - is the
strength of conviction openly expressed in the QM foundations literature by parties on all sides
of the interpretation issue.... In an otherwise excellent review, A. Fine writes ”It should be clear
by now that I find the instrumentalist interpretation of the theory repugnant. Indeed I find
it sad that the discredited philosophical positivism of the 1930’s, away from those doctrines the
behavioral sciences are finally being weaned, should find its last ditch supporters among the middle
generation of physicists...” [67]. I am inclined to agree; sad indeed..., but such intensity is perhaps
less surprising when one considers the also uncharacteristic and much publicized early foundations
debate between Einstein and Bohr [36]. Ballentine, under fire, maintaining his usual composure
and clarity laments that ”The entirely reasonable question, ’Are there hidden-variable theories
consistent with quantum theory, and if so, what are their characteristics?,’ has been unfortunately
clouded by emotionalism. A discussion of the historical and psychological origins of this attitude
would not be useful here. We shall only quote one example of an argument which is in no way
extreme (inglis, 1961, p.4), ’Quantum mechanics is so broadly successful and convincing that the
quest [for hv’s] does not seem hopeful.’ The vacuous characteristic of this argument should be
apparent, for the success of quantum theory within its domain of definition (i.e., the calculation
of statistical distributions of events) has no bearing on the existence of a broader theory (i.e., one
which could predict individual events.)”. [51]
34
claims to the contrary [68]) has yet to be run [10, 69].
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